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ABSTRACT 
With the emergence of E-Commerce communication security has become a very important issue. Two main 
considerations of secure communication systems are authentication, and key distribution.  Authentication and key 
distribution may differ from one system to another due to the system parameters such as bandwidth, and available 
processing power at the end terminals. This paper focuses on end-to-end authentication and key management strategies 
in wireless and wired systems.  Public and secret key encryption techniques are used to provide authentication and key 
distribution.      
 
 
INTRODUCTION   
As the use electronic communications play an ever-increasing role in business activities, security in communications 
through networking environments is becoming very important.  It is very important to preserve the confidentiality, 
data integrity, and authenticity of sensitive information to prevent fraud.  In cryptography all modern algorithms use a 
key to control encryption and decryption; a message can be decrypted only if the key matches the encryption key.  The 
key used for decryption can be different from the encryption key, but for most algorithms they are the same. 
 
There are two classes of key-based algorithms, symmetric (or secret-key) and asymmetric (or public-key) 
algorithms.  The difference is that symmetric algorithms use the same key for encryption and decryption (or the 
decryption key is easily derived from the encryption key), whereas asymmetric algorithms use a different key for 
encryption and decryption, and the decryption key cannot be derived from the encryption key.  The public-key 
algorithms permit the encryption key to be public, allowing anyone to encrypt with that key, whereas only the proper 
recipient (who knows the decryption key) can decrypt the message.  The encryption key is called the public key and 
the decryption key the private key or secret key [1].  
 
Public key methods require in complex computations compared to secret key methods. However, since the public key 
can be distributed through an insecure channel key management is easier in public key systems. Also, the public key 
schemes can be used to generate digital signatures for authentication. Therefore, the public key schemes are usually 
used for distribution of a session key, which will be used to encrypt general traffic (files, multimedia etc.). However, 
the complex computations are not suitable for systems with low processing power and the secret key schemes should 
be used for providing key distribution and authentication in real time.  
 
In wired systems where computers posses high processing power, public key techniques can be used for key 
distribution. On the other hand, in wireless systems where mobile stations have low processing power secret key 
techniques should be used.  In this paper we propose authentication and key distribution techniques for both wired and 
wireless systems.  
 
 
AUTHENTICATION AND KEY DISTRIBUTION TECHNIQUES 
The secret key schemes require the keys to be shared with a third party which is trusted by all users. The third party 
generates a session key for two users to communicate securely. The shared keys are used to distribute this session key 
to the respective users.  Authentication is done through a challenge response scheme [2]. 
 
The public key schemes on the other hand uses the recipients public key to encrypt the session key. Authentication is 
done with the use of certificates. A certification authority (CA), which is assumed to be trusted by all users, is 
responsible for providing these certificates [3]. 
Certificate generation and verification processors are done using public key encryption techniques and one way 
hashing functions.  For generating a certificate the user identity (i) and public key (Pi) are first hashed using one way 
hashing function.  Then the hashed value h(i,Pi) is encrypted using the private key SCA of the Certification Authority 
(CA) to generate the certificate shown in Figure 1(a). 
 
Since the public keys of the CA and the user (PCA and Pi) can be published the validity of the certificate can be readily 
verified.  For verification, first the certificate is decrypted using PCA to obtain the hashed h(i,Pi).  Using the user 
identity (i) and public key Pi the hashed value h’(i,Pi) can be locally calculated.  The two-hashed values are then 
compared to authenticate the user as shown in Figure 1(b).    
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Figure 1 Certificate Generation and Verification Process 
 
 
WIRELESS  SYSTEMS  
Managing keys through a control centre (CC) is considered for wireless systems. In this method a CC is assumed to be 
‘trusted’ by all MS’s. Each MS shares a secret key and a secret identification code with the CC.  Therefore, the CC has 
to maintain a database of shared secret keys and shared secret identification codes of all the mobile stations supported 
by it.  
 
Consider two mobile stations MS A and MS B that belong to two different groups.  The MS A shares its secret key Ka 
and identification code Ca with the CC.  Similarly, MS B shares its secret key Kb and identification code Cb with the 
CC.  Time stamps are included in some messages to give them a limited lifetime of transmission to prevent replay 
attacks.  Sensitive information such as identification codes, session keys, and time stamps are encrypted using session 
keys, which are derived by hashing the shared secret keys (Ka or Kb) with random numbers as shown in Figure 2.   
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Figure 2: Key management through a Control Centre 
 
When MS A wishes to communicate with MS B, it derives a session key Krna by hashing Ka with a random number 
RNa and encrypts Ca and a time stamp Ta using the derived session key Krna.  Then MS A sends its identity ia, B’s 
identity ib, RNa, and the encrypted message EKrna{Ta,Ca} to the CC.  The CC looks ia and ib up in its database and 
obtains Ka, Ca, Kb, and Cb.  Then the CC derives the session key using RNa and Ka, and decrypts EKrna{Ta,Ca} to 
obtain Ta and Ca.  The CC checks the validity of Ta and authenticates MS A by comparing the received Ca with the 
stored Ca.  If MS A is authentic the CC generates a random number RNcc and hashes it with Ka and Kb to derive two 
session keys Ksa and Ksb to encrypt messages for MS A and MS B.  The CC also generates another random session 
key Kab, which will be used later as the session key for encrypting and decrypting traffic between MS A and MS B.  
Then the CC encrypts Kab, Ca, and a time stamp Tcc using Ksa to obtain EKsa{Kab,Ca,Tcc}.  The CC also encrypts Kab, 
Cb, and Tcc using Ksb to obtain EKsb{Kab,Cb,Tcc}.  The CC sends these two encrypted messages and RNcc back to MS 
A. 
 
MS A derives the session key Ksa using received RNcc and its Ka and decrypts EKsa{Kab.Ca,Tcc} to obtain Kab,Ca, and 
Tcc.  Then it checks the validity of Tcc and authenticates the CC by comparing the received Ca with the stored Ca.  If 
CC is authentic MS A generates a random number RNab and encrypts the received RNcc using Kab to obtain 
EKab{RNcc}.  Then it forwards EKab{RNcc}, RNab and EKsb{Kab,Cb,Tcc}, and RNcc to the MS B. 
 
When MS B receives the message from MS A, it derives Kab by hashing the received RNcc and its shared key Kb. 
Then it decrypts EKsb{Kab,Cb,Tcc} and checks the validity of the time stamp and authenticates the CC by comparing the 
received Cb with the stored Cb.  Then it decrypts EKab{RNcc}, and compares it with the received RNcc.  The received 
RNcc and the decrypted RNcc will be equal only if MS A has the correct session key Kab.  Therefore, MS B can 
authenticate MS A by the comparison. If MS A is authentic MS B encrypts the received RNab using the derived session 
key Kab and sends this encrypted message EKab{RNab} back to MS A.  MS A decrypts the received encrypted message 
EKab{RNab} to obtain RNab and compares it with the previously generated RNab.  If they are equal MS B is authentic.  
Then MS A and MS B use Kab to secure traffic between them. 
 
It is important to note that, both MS A and MS B authenticate the CC.  Additionally, MS A and MS B mutually 
authenticate each other during the process of key distribution.  This is very important to prevent security breaches of 
the system.  This is the main reason for generating the session key Kab in the CC rather than by the MS’s. 
 
An important consideration in this technique is to keep the number of call set-ups to a minimum to reduce the overall 
key distribution time.  In this technique only two call set-ups are required.  This system is useful for mobile stations 
with low processing power, which cannot carryout complex public-key computations in real time.  For mobiles with 
high processing power, public key techniques can be used for key distribution.  
 
 
WIRED SYSTEMS 
Availability of high bandwidth and high processing power of the computing devices allow public key techniques to be 
used for authentication and key distribution in wired systems.  
 
In public key protocols two parties which require secure communication exchanges the certificates obtained from a 
trusted certification authority (CA) to authenticate each other. Public key schemes are also used to distribute session 
keys. Here, both communicating parties involve in the generation of the session key. More specifically, each party 
generates a random session key and securely distributes it to the other end. Then the two keys are combined to obtain 
the session key that is used to secure traffic between the two parties. Involvement of both parties in the generation of 
the session key avoids replay attacks by a third party. In addition, this process enables one party to check whether 
other party posses the private key corresponding to the public key it receives from the other party.  
 
The proposed protocol procedure is shown in Figure 3. When station-A wants to establish a secure communication 
with the station-B, it sends its certificate CA, identity IDA, and public key PA to station-B. Station-B verifies this 
certificate and if it is valid, sends its certificate CB, identity IDB, and public key PB to station-A. Station-A then verifies 
the certificate of station-B.  
 
Even though both certificates may be valid, still there is an uncertainty about whether the two parties possess the 
proper private keys. This is because the transmitted information can be recorded by a third party and can be used for 
authentication. In this case, the certificate will appear as a valid one to a recipient even though it is not sent by the 
legitimate user. Therefore, further checks are carried out to authenticate the communicating parties, station-A and 
station-B.         
 
Station-A generates locally a random number x and hashes it using a one-way hashing function. Then the hashed value 
is encrypted using the private key SA of station-A to create a signature S[H(x)]. The random number x and the 
signature S[H(x)] are then encrypted using the public key PB of station-B and this encrypted message E[S[H(x)], x]  is 
sent to station-B. When station-B receives this message, it obtains x by decrypting it and verifies the signature as 
shown in figure 3.   
 
Similarly, station-B generates a random number y and a signature. Then it encrypts the signature S[H(y)], the numbers 
y, and x using the public key PA of station-A and sends this message E[S[H(y)], y, x] to station-A. When station-A 
receives this message it obtains x, and y by decrypting it and verifies the signature S[H(y)]. Then it compares the 
received x with the previously generated x, to check whether station-B has the proper private key. If the two x’s are the 
same, station B is considered to be authentic. Once station-B is authenticated, station-A encrypts the number y using 
the public key PB of station-B and sends it to station-B.  Station-B compares the received y with the previously 
generated y to authenticate station A. 
 
After both stations are authenticated the two parties hash the numbers x and y to create a session key to encrypt traffic 
between them.  
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Figure 3 Authentication and Key distribution 
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper authentication and key distribution strategies for wireless and wired systems were presented. Two 
protocols were proposed in this paper. Both protocols have been designed to suite the processing power available in 
the end devices (i.e. mobile and computing devices).  
 
For wireless systems secret key schemes were used because the mobile stations do not possess enough processing 
power to perform the complex public key calculations in real time. Therefore, the proposed protocol uses a control 
centre to generate session keys for two users who require secure communication. The control centre requires a 
database to store all the shared secret information.  
 
The availability of high processing power in the wired systems allows the public key schemes to be used for 
authentication and key distribution. The proposed protocol for wired systems performs additional operations to verify 
whether the parties involved possess the proper private keys. Also, both parties involve in the session key generation 
process which enhances the security of the system. In addition, the authentication protocol for wired systems 
overcomes the drawbacks of shared secret key protocols (i.e. reflection attack). 
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